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Abstract 
The majority of South African municipalities facing the challenges of unemployment, poverty and weak 
infrastructure are in rural areas. To fulfil their mandate, they depend significantly on financial 
transfers.  This is something that the government is focused on minimising as evidenced by the recent 
Department of Cooperative Governance and Traditional Affairs proposal of amalgamating many 
municipalities to make them self-reliant and functional.  This paper asks the question: ‘will 
amalgamations of rural municipalities correct for financial viability and functionality’? Using case 
studies of amalgamated municipalities, the paper observes that amalgamations will not make all rural 
municipalities self-sufficient and functional. 
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Introduction and problem statement 
Local government in South Africa is facing a myriad of challenges that include poor economic growth 
and high levels of unemployment and poverty. According to the South African Department of 
Cooperative Governance and Traditional Affairs (COGTA), a third of municipalities were classified as 
dysfunctional and unviable (whatever the definition), while another third are at risk, and the remaining 
third are functional and viable (Department of Cooperative Governance and Traditional Affairs 2015). 
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The majority of unviable municipalities are in rural areas and depend significantly on grants to fulfil 
their mandates. The government is aiming to minimise this dependency, as evidenced by the recent 
proposal by COGTA to amalgamate many municipalities to make them self-reliant.  
The COGTA sought to correct for dysfunctionality and financial unviability through the redrawing of 
municipal boundaries or simple amalgamation of some municipalities. In other words, the 2016 
amalgamations were partly motivated by the desire to eliminate dependency and improve municipal 
functionality. According to the government proposal, financial viability equated to self-reliance or self-
sufficiency. Dependency on grants is considered to be an indicator of lack of financial viability and a 
problem that can be addressed through demarcation, i.e. dividing the country into spaces that have 
roughly even revenue bases.  
The idea of amalgamating municipalities to correct for dysfunctionality and improve their financial 
municipalities raises a number of research questions. First, is there a common understanding of what 
constitutes a viable municipality, and will merging municipalities create financially viable or self-reliant 
rural municipalities? Furthermore, is there a link between functionality and boundary changes, and can 
a boundary change or amalgamation solve functionality challenges?  The main objective of this paper 
is to empirically evaluate the substance of the argument that the 2016 amalgamations will create ‘viable’ 
or self -sufficient/self-reliant or functional rural municipalities.  
Thus, the purpose of this study is to assess whether municipalities which were due for demarcation 
during the 2016 local government elections will be viable and functional, at least according to the 
COGTA definition of viability and functionality. The data used in this paper is mainly secondary, and 
was sourced from National Treasury databases.  
Background 
Historical context of municipal demarcation in South Africa 
Demarcations and amalgamations in the local government sphere are not a new phenomenon in South 
Africa. Between 1948 and 1994, the country’s decentralisation demarcated jurisdictions and organised 
governance on the basis of race, rather than on the basis of functional linkages or similar criteria (van 
Ryneveld 1996). The racially-driven, decentralised governance system consisted of two main categories 
– white local authorities (WLAs) and black local authorities (BLAs).1  
                                                             
1 “The development of segregated local government bodies for Coloureds and Indians followed a separate path 
from that for Africans. Under the Group Areas Amendment Act of 1962, provincial administrators constituted 
‘Local Affairs Committees’ or ‘Management Committees’ in designated Coloured and Indian areas. In their initial 
phases, these committees were intended to act in a purely consultative capacity in relation to WLAs, which 
retained administrative control over their areas. These committees would subsequently be granted full local 
authority status in terms of the criteria set out by provincial administrators in relation to a prescribed range of 
local issues. Despite their transformation into wholly elected entities, very few attained full local authority, as the 
majority of the committees status remained mere advisory bodies with little powers beyond granting trading 
licenses” (Lemon 1992). 
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WLAs represented the earliest example of fiscal decentralisation in South Africa. Established in the 
early 1900s, they covered most of the country’s urban areas, and were primarily responsible for 
providing services to urban white, Coloured and Indian citizens living in areas outside of the homelands. 
Access to relatively wealthy social groups meant that WLAs enjoyed a high degree of fiscal autonomy. 
In fact the notion of a viable municipality comes from the era of WLAs. WLAs were ‘viable’ in the 
sense that they were self-sufficient. They had all the tax bases (property taxes and fees) and so relied 
entirely on own revenues but served only a small section of the population. In contrast, post-1994 
municipalities have a fundamentally different mandate, do not have all the tax bases, rely significantly 
on transfers and cover entire populations, including rural areas. Therefore, it is difficult to subscribe to 
the same notion of viability. 
Initially administered by adjacent WLAs, the BLAs evolved from the community councils that were 
introduced in response to the uprisings of June 1976. The BLAs enjoyed very little political legitimacy, 
as they were regarded as a façade set up by the apartheid regime to give some form of democracy to 
black South Africans, while entrenching segregation (Bahl and Smoke 2003). The BLAs were unable 
to develop productive tax bases because of apartheid restrictions on economic development in black 
areas, insufficient socio-economic infrastructure that could generate service fees, and lack of access to 
property, quality education and formal employment among black South Africans. As a result, BLAs 
generated very little own-revenue, operated inefficient fiscal systems, and lacked the capacity to provide 
the necessary socio-economic services (Amusa and Mabugu 2016). 
For much of the late 1980s and early 1990s, public anger over appalling service levels and attempts to 
impose rents and service charges in the BLAs led to violent rent boycotts, and fuelled the drive by civic 
organisations and activists to link local grievances to internal efforts to overthrow apartheid. As part of 
political efforts to end apartheid, a Local Government Negotiating Forum (LGNF) was established in 
1992, and tasked with negotiating local settlements to rent and service boycotts, and amalgamating 
racially divided local authorities into a new local government system that would be more widely 
accepted. By 1993, negotiations at the LGNF resulted in the enactment of the Local Government 
Transition Act (LGTA) which outlined three phases – the pre-interim, interim and final phases as steps 
towards completing the formal role of local governments under a democratic dispensation (Smoke 
2001; Powell 2012). 
The pre-interim phase covered the period between the democratic election of 1994 and the first local 
government democratic elections held in 1995/96. In terms of the LGTA, local government was 
organised through locally negotiated transitional councils that were established via “negotiating 
transitional forums” within each municipal area. Representation on these transitional councils took the 
form of members appointed in equal proportions from statutory institutions (such as the WLAs, BLAs 
and designated Indian and Coloured administrations), and non-statutory bodies (mainly civic 
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organisations, trade unions and previously unrepresented political parties). This phase concluded with 
1995/96 local government elections which ushered in the interim phase. A major prerequisite for the 
1995/96 local government elections was to amalgamate the inherited apartheid-era local government 
structures. To facilitate this, the LGTA provided for the establishment of a Local Government 
Demarcation Board in each of the nine provinces, and granted these boards advisory powers to make 
recommendations on matters relating to boundary and ward delimitation to their respective provincial 
Ministers of Local Government. 
The process of boundary and ward delimitation for the interim phase led to the creation of three types 
of municipalities: metropolitan, urban and rural. The six large urbanised areas of the country (four in 
the Johannesburg–Pretoria area plus one each in Durban and Cape Town) were administered within a 
two-tier system consisting of transitional metropolitan councils (TMCs) and transitional metropolitan 
substructures, while transitional local councils (TLCs) were established to govern urban areas. For rural 
areas not included within TLCs, local governance structures took one of three types: transitional 
representative councils, transitional rural councils (TRCs) and district councils (Schroeder 2003; 
Cameron 2006).  
Chapter 7 of the 1996 Constitution made provision for three categories of municipalities: (i) Category 
A municipalities (metropolitan councils) that exclusively covered large urban areas; (ii) Category B 
municipalities (local councils) that administer non-metropolitan areas, which vary in size and extent of 
urbanisation, and (iii) Category C municipalities (districts councils).2 The Local Government 
Demarcation Act (No. 27 of 1998) became the major policy instrument for dismantling locally 
segregated local government and ushering in the final phase of the local government transformation 
process (Government of South Africa 1998). In line with the Constitution, which stipulates that 
municipal boundaries are demarcated by an independent body, the Act merged the nine provincial 
demarcation boards into a single entity: the Municipal Demarcation Board (MDB). Unlike provincial 
boards, which had played a largely advisory role, the MDB was granted the status of the final decision-
making body over matters of municipal demarcation and delimitation of municipal borders.3  
In preparation for the 2000 local elections, which commenced the final phase of transforming the local 
government sphere, the MDB initiated two important changes to the composition of local governments. 
First, it established “wall-to-wall” municipalities, in accordance with the Constitution that called for 
                                                             
2 These district councils succeeded joint structures between local authorities that had been established via the 
Regional Services Council Act of 1985 and named “Regional Services Councils” (RSCs) and “Joint Services 
Boards” (JSBs). The main function of the RSCs and JSBs was to operate a regional system for providing “bulk” 
infrastructure services in larger urban areas, especially poor black areas, as well as some rural areas.   
3 Where applicable, these powers were subject to a process that afforded any aggrieved parties or stakeholders the 
right to appeal decisions by the MDB, and for the MDB to consider such appeals.  
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municipalities to “be established for the whole of the territory of the Republic”4 (De Visser 2005, p.75). 
Second, the MDB consolidated the former TLCs into a single local jurisdiction, which meant that a 
number of former TLCs would be included within the boundaries of Category B municipalities. As a 
result of the MDB’s demarcation process, by the 2000 local elections, the complex system of 843 
transitional municipalities had been consolidated into 284 municipalities. The country’s six largest 
urbanised and industrialised centres made up the Category A municipalities. Outside the metropolitan 
areas, a two-tier structure was established with 231 Category B municipalities falling within 47 
Category C district councils. Then, in preparation for the 2006 local elections, the MDB consolidated 
the number of municipalities to 283. This reconfiguration resulted in the disappearance of cross-
boundary municipalities. Ahead of the 2011 local elections, the number of municipalities was further 
reduced to 278: Category A municipalities (Metropolitan or Metros) increased from 6 to 8, while the 
number of local municipalities (LMs) and district municipalities (DMs) decreased to 226 and 44, 
respectively.  
The motive underpinning the demarcations in the 1990s was to de-racialise municipalities that were 
segregated along apartheid spatial lines and, to an extent, redistribute resources from affluent 
municipalities to poor municipalities. White municipalities had clear tax bases, capacity and other 
resources but were only serving very small populations, whereas the black authorities consisted of 
mainly townships, tended not to have strong tax bases, and were characterised by a culture of poor 
services and non-payment for services. For example, in Cape Town, the main rationale for 
amalgamation in 1996 was to redistribute from rich municipalities to poor municipalities. The Western 
Cape Demarcation Board deliberately drew the boundaries of Cape Town to amalgamate the former 
black and white municipalities. This resulted in a one-tier municipality with geographic boundaries that 
cover the economic region. However, amalgamating the previously black and white local authorities 
created problems, such as collapsing infrastructure (e.g. water and sewerage systems) because of the 
increasing number of people that now had to be serviced. Other challenges included financial stress due 
to increasing salaries, limited experience and lack of capacity.  
In 2002, financial viability became a demarcation issue after The Presidential Coordinating Council 
(PCC) passed a number of resolutions on local government, including the need to build financially 
viable municipalities. The issues of municipal financial viability are not new but has still not been 
resolved 15 years after developing local government.  
Demarcations in 2016 
In 2015 the Minister of COGTA proposed further boundary changes that would see more municipalities 
becoming even larger. As noted above, the principal motivation for these changes was to ensure that 
                                                             
4  There was one exception, namely the District Management Areas; i.e. sparsely populated areas such as Kruger 
National Park which were not under any local municipality, but were governed by a district municipality as spelt 
out in Section 6 of the Municipal Structures Act.  
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municipalities are financially viable and functional. This study addresses the question of whether these 
amalgamations will result in viable (self-sufficient/self-reliant) or functional municipalities.  The 2015 
boundary redeterminations will reduce the number of municipalities by 21, from 278 to 257. Table 1 
shows the distribution of municipalities affected by demarcations due in 2016. 
Table 1: Municipalities affected by boundary redeterminations for 2016 5  
New municipality Affected municipalities (amalgamations) 
Eastern Cape 
 Camdeboo LM, Baviaans LM and Ikwezi LM 
EC129 Nxuba LM and Nkonkobe LM 
EC139 Inkwanca LM, Tsolwana LM and Lukanji LM 
EC145 Gariep LM and Maletswai LM 
KwaZulu Natal 
KZN212 Vulamehlo LM and Umdoni LM 
KZN216 Ezinqoleni LM and Hibiscus Coast LM 
KZN237 Umtshezi LM and Imbabazane LM 
KZN238 Emnambithi/ Ladysmith LM and Indaka LM 
KZN276 Hlabisa LM and The Big Five False Bay LM 
KZN282 uMhlathuze LM and Ntambanana LM 
KZN285 Mthonjaneni LM and Ntambanana LM 
KZN436 KwaSani LM and Ingwe LM  
Free State 
MAN Mangaung Metro and Naledi LM 
Limpopo 
LIM341 Musina LM and Mutale LM 
LIM343 Thulamela LM and Mutale LM 
LIM345 Makhado LM and Thulamela LM 
LIM351 Blouberg LM and Aganang LM 
LIM353 Molemole LM and Aganang LM 
LIM354 Polokwane LM and Aganang LM 
LIM368 Modimolle LM and Mookgopong LM 
LIM476 Fetagomo LM and Gretaer Tubatse LM 
Mpumalanga 
MP326 Umjindi LM and Mbombela LM 
Northern Cape 
NC087 Mier LM  and //Khara Hais LM 
North West 
NW405 Tlokwe LM and Venterdorp LM 
   Source: MDB Circular 2015  
Amalgamation of municipalities was not the only instrument used to improve the performance of the 
local government. Government and other entities have initiated a number of projects and programmes 
aimed at improving the performance of the sector (Figure 1). After the 2000 local government elections, 
the government introduced project consolidate in 2004 (COGTA 2004). This initiative was a hands-on 
                                                             
5 The three tier local government consists of metropolitans (Metros), district municipalities (DMs) and local 
municipalities (LMs). The DMs overlay a number of local municipalities 
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programme to support local government. In 2006, the Development Bank of Southern Africa (DBSA) 
initiated the Siyenza Manje project; a capacity building initiative jointly funded by DBSA and National 
Treasury (DBSA 2009). In 2009 a local government turnaround strategy was launched by the 
Department of Cooperative Governance (Department of Cooperative Governance 2009). Another 
milestone in the development of the local government sector was the launch of the National 
Development plan in 2011, which sought the creation of a capable local government (National Planning 
Commission 2011). In 2013 the government enacted the Spatial Planning Land Management Act, 
followed by the Back to Basics programme in 2014, and the Integrated Urban Development Framework 
in 2016. 
Figure 1: Other local government initiatives since 2000 
 
Source: Authors’ illustrations and South African Cities Network (2016) 
Literature review 
South Africa’s local government sector within a global context 
With the reduction in the number of municipalities, from 278 to 257, a comparison with other countries 
is pertinent. International literature is clear that no standard size of a municipality exists, whether by 
geographical space, population size or political representation. South Africa has one of the lowest 
number of municipalities in the world, but the country has (a) one of the largest average populations 
per municipality (Figure 2), and (b) one of the highest number of citizens per councillor (Table 2). This 
situation has far-reaching implications for political representation, and democratic and governance 
accountability. When a local government structure is large, access to authority through public hearings, 
meetings, elections or direct contact is difficult; political representatives are far removed from the 
electorate; and citizen participation is weaker.  
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Figure 2: Number of municipalities and average municipal population sizes  
 
Source: Financial and Fiscal Commission (2016)  
 
Table 2: Number of citizens per councillor 
 Number of councillors Number of citizens per councillor 
Namibia (2010) 323 6929 
Botswana (2014) 589 3660 
Republic of Ireland (2014) 949 4861 
Mozambique (2014) 1196 20937 
Lesotho (2011) 1276 1502 
New Zealand (2000) 1892 2039 
Zimbabwe (2013) 1962 6854 
Philippines (2000) 2102 37075 
Malaysia (2000) 2921 7654 
Nepal (2000) 3344 7099 
Australia (2000) 6637 2886 
South Africa (2011) 9090 5671 
Madagascar (2008) 9608 2335 
Canada (2014) 19534 1819 
Japan (2000) 62452 2031 
China (2000)  653244 1933 
NB: The date in brackets indicates the year during which data was collected 
Source: Financial and Fiscal Commission (2016) 
Why amalgamate municipalities?  
Literature cites a number of reasons for amalgamations including that of economies of scale and scope. 
Bigger municipalities are considered far much effective for service delivery than smaller fragmented 
municipalities. In South Africa literature cites four reasons for municipal amalgamations: (a) to 
deracialise local government, (b) to achieve equity; (c) create efficiencies and economies of scale; (d) 
promote integration of rural and urban municipalities, (e) improve the financial and administrative 
capacity of smaller municipalities by combining existing capacities and (f) improve service delivery 
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and broaden revenue bases of municipalities (Government of South Africa 1998; Peterson and Annez 
2007; Kanyane and Koma 2006.). The municipal mergers immediately after the new democratic 
dispensation were largely focused on integrating different races and redistributing resources from more 
affluent municipalities to poor ones, while later mergers put emphasis on improving service delivery 
and broadening the revenue base.  
International literature abounds with literature on municipal mergers and reasons for such 
amalgamations. Slack and Bird (2013a, 2013b) have noted that bigger municipalities perform better 
than fragmented ones. The argument is that “bigger is better” and “bigger is cheaper” because larger 
municipalities result in improved productivity, cost savings, enhanced quality and mix of public goods, 
increases administrative and technical capacity and promotes effective lobbying with other spheres of 
government (Dollery and Robotti 2008).  Municipal amalgamation eliminates some duplication, for 
instance, the number of politicians and bureaucrats could be reduced. Bigger municipalities are more 
often able to provide an extensive array of services than small fragmented municipalities (Dollery et al. 
2007; Slack and Bird, 2013a).  
On the other hand, international literature also puts across very strong arguments against consolidation.  
Slack and Bird (2013a) argue that amalgamations of municipalities with different service levels and 
wage scales often translate into increased expenditures. According to these authors, salaries and benefits 
tend to equalise up to the level of the former municipality with the highest expenditures. This upward 
harmonisation of wages and salaries generally outweighs any cost savings. Consequently, in smaller 
municipalities, those employees who become part of the amalgamated municipality could demand wage 
parity with their counterparts at the larger municipality thus pushing its operating costs higher. Faguet 
(2004, 2011) argues that many smaller municipalities stimulate competition, which is sometimes an 
incentive for them to be efficient, responsive and accountable to community needs.  
However, despite all the strong arguments for and against consolidation, empirical evidence is at best 
mixed (Lago-Penas and Martinez-Vazquez 2013) and suggests that there is no optimal municipal size 
(Boyne 1998; Oakerson 1999; Bish 2000; Dollery et al. 2012). After reviewing research in the UK and 
USA on economies of scale, Byrnes and Dollery (2002) concluded that only 8% of the studies found 
evidence of economies of scale, 24% found evidence of diseconomies of scale, 29% found evidence of 
U-shaped cost curves and 39% found no evidence of economies of scale. On the other hand, a study of 
the amalgamations of Canadian municipalities found no evidence of economies of scale post 2005–
2008 boundary changes (Found 2012). In the USA, Boyne (1995) found evidence that consolidation is 
associated with higher spending while in Canada, Kushner and Siegel (2005) found that amalgamations 
of local governments improved efficiency in some municipalities while inefficiencies increased after 
some amalgamations. Cowley (2009) further argues that service delivery and administrative efficiencies 
are achieved with high-density developments, but are compromised with spread-out, low-density 
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developments that are more costly to serve. Therefore, amalgamation may not achieve the economies 
of scale hoped for, but merely avoids insolvency for the dissolving municipality by spreading its 
operating costs over a wider tax base. 
Table 3 summarises this literature. The main message from this literature is that boundary changes can 
either have positive or negative fiscal consequences on municipalities as well as on their fiscal/financial 
viability. It is an issue that can be answered empirically as it depends on a number of contextual issues. 
Table 3: Summary of literature on the impact of municipal boundary changes 
Author  Country  Findings  
Dollery et al. (2007) South 
Australia  
 
The study looked at the impact of municipal amalgamation on financial viability of the 
south Australian local government; focusing on whether a size of a municipality 
improves its viability. The results indicate that there is no correlation between the 
municipal size and its viability. It further suggests that alternative methods to improve 
viability and effectiveness of local authority be pursued.   
Forsyth (2010) America The question asked in this study is: “Is a county’s post consolidation (boundary 
change) economic development significantly better than reconsolidation 
development?” Using time series regression analysis the study concluded that 
consolidations have significant impact on the distribution of economic burdens within 
a county, while impacts on economic development are not significant and limited on 
social development. The study also concludes that there are no efficiency gains that 
result from consolidation of counties.   
Savitch and Vogel 
(2004) 
America The study tests the hypothesis that city-county consolidation promotes efficiency, 
equity and accountability. The study found that mergers reduce efficiency, costs 
associated with transition and harmonising employment and wages increases, minimal 
cost savings, inequities continue and accountability problems worsen. 
Fleischmann (1986) America The study looks at the benefits and costs of local boundary changes and who are the 
losers or winners. The study uses a case study methodology. The findings note gains 
such as new revenues sources (increased tax base). Areas that were poor before 
boundary changes benefited in the form of improved service delivery. The study notes 
also political and social costs/benefits. The study also found that in boundary changes 
the winners are largely the private actors.  
Ncube and Vacu 
(2014) 
South Africa 
 
This study looked at the fiscal and financial impacts of municipal boundary changes.  
The case studies and the econometric models in this study suggest that demarcation 
processes in South Africa have resulted in unintended economic consequences and 
significant transaction costs, especially during the transition phase.  
City of Tshwane 
Budget Office (2013) 
South Africa This study sought to quantify the costs of the merger between the City of Tshwane 
and two local municipalities (Nokeng tsa Taemane and Kungwini). The findings of this 
study suggest that the costs related to this amalgamation were close to R1 billion.   
Reingewertz (2012) Israel The study assessed the fiscal outcomes of municipal amalgamation using the 
difference in differences method. The results indicate that amalgamation leads to a 
decrease in municipal expenditures but at the same time, it causes no decrease on 
the quality of services provided. Based on this, the study concludes that amalgamation 
may have a positive impact on municipal viability.    
Fritz (2013) Germany The study examined whether the large scale municipal amalgamations had an impact 
on the fiscal outcomes of the municipalities in Germany, using differences in difference 
approach. The results suggest that it has a significant effect, indicating a positive 
impact of municipal amalgamation on debt per capita and expenditure per capita and 
a negative impact on expenditure for administrative staff. 
Methodology 
According to COGTA, a third of municipalities are dysfunctional and unviable (whatever the definition) 
while another third are at risk, and the remaining third are functional and viable. The motivation 
underpinning the COGTA proposal is the elimination of dysfunctional and non-viable municipalities. 
This section explains how viability, functionality and revenue-raising capacity are evaluated.  
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Functionality 
Functionality refers to how badly or how well a municipality operates, delivers services and accounts 
for the money it spends. The functionality of rural municipalities scheduled for amalgamation in 2016 
will be assessed by looking at the functionality indicators of management stability, fiscal stress levels 
and audit profiles. 
Viability 
The self-sufficiency or self-reliance (viability) of a municipality can be measured by its ability to raise 
own revenues to pay for basic public services (as per its constitutional mandate). One way of assessing 
the ability of demarcated municipalities to fulfil their constitutional mandate is to compare the gap 
between expenditure needs and revenue-raising capacity (Bandyopadhyay 2013). This gap is often 
referred to as the need-capacity gap or fiscal gap. Expenditure needs refer to the amount of money 
needed to provide minimum acceptable levels of public goods (water, electricity, refuse removal, roads, 
etc.), while revenue-raising capacity refers to revenues that the municipality can raise from own sources 
(own revenues) when exerting a standard amount of effort.  
A municipality’s revenue-raising capacity depends on its fiscal capacity, which can be measured using 
many variables. These variables range from a municipality’s tax and revenue base, to its socio-economic 
framework and all other political and legal constraints that may prevent its full revenue potential being 
realised. The most important component of a municipality’s fiscal capacity is its economic base. Fiscal 
capacity will be assessed using the following measures:  
 Per capita income (the wealth or income of a municipality divided by its population) captures 
a municipality’s ability to handle a tax burden, or ability of individuals within a municipality 
to meet the financial needs of the community. The measure is simple and easier to understand. 
 Per capita gross value added (GVA) captures the value of goods and services produced by a 
municipality over a given period. A higher per capita GVA value signifies a larger revenue base 
and greater ability to pay taxes. 
 Employment (and unemployment) rates are indicators of a municipality’s fiscal capacity. A 
higher employment rate implies a bigger tax base, as employed people pay taxes and fees, 
whereas a high unemployment rate means a smaller revenue base for a municipality. 
 Property rates per capita are an important measure of fiscal capacity for local governments. 
These taxes are significant in many municipality governments. A municipality with many 
properties/estates is likely to raise more revenues. Similarly when property values increase, 
revenue yields are likely to increase. 
The following section tackles the issue of whether amalgamated municipalities will be viable in the 
COGTA sense. 
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Amalgamation and municipal viability 
In the COGTA proposal, viability refers to the ability of municipalities to fulfil their constitutional 
mandates using their own resources. In other words, demarcations will result in municipalities that are 
self-reliant and self-sufficient, have a strong fiscal base to support their constitutional mandates and 
minimum dependency on intergovernmental transfers. Fiscal capacity is crucial for a municipality to be 
viable/self-sufficient or self-reliant, and so the fiscal capacities of the soon-to-be-demarcated 
municipalities were evaluated using a number of indicators, including revenue-raising capacity. As with 
other studies (Bandyopadhyay 2013; Yilmaz et al. 2007), all measures of fiscal capacity were indexed 
to the average, i.e. the average for each measure of fiscal capacity drawn from the whole of South Africa 
was equated to 100 and this was used as a base, against which individual municipality indicators were 
compared. These indicators are not measures of the fiscal health of a municipality but a relative gauge 
of whether or not a particular municipality can sustain all the assigned mandates using its own resources 
without intervention from national and provincial governments. Furthermore, the South African average 
is not necessarily the optimum but, in the absence of norms or standards, gives an indication of where 
an average municipality is operating in South Africa. The reader is also reminded that these measures 
evaluate a municipality’s fiscal capacities relative to the national average, not their absolute fiscal 
capacities.  
Dependency on transfers 
Self-sufficient municipalities do not need to depend on transfers for their basic needs and are capable 
of delivering a range of services using own revenues. A simple dependency ratio (transfers/operating 
revenues) can reveal whether municipalities can sustain their mandates without significant assistance 
from national and provincial governments. The ratios used are the local government equitable share 
(LGES) as a share of total municipal operating revenue and transfer capital funding as a percentage of 
total capital funding.  
As Figure 3 shows, the dependency ratios vary widely, from metros (A) that derive less than 10% of 
their revenues from transfers, to district municipalities (C) that rely on transfers for almost 90% of their 
total revenues. The majority of rural municipalities (B3s and B4s)6 virtually all depend on transfers for 
more than 20% of their revenues, with most B4s relying on transfers for more than 50% of revenue. 
These municipalities are unlikely to be self-reliant and will always be dependent on transfers. In the 
case of the municipalities that are due for demarcation, a majority of them depend for more than 50% 
of their operational revenues on the LGES. A similar picture emerges for capital funding (Figure 4).  
                                                             
6 In addition to metropolitan municipalities, South Africa has the following municipal categories: B1s are 
municipalities dominated by secondary cities; B2s are municipalities with a large town as its core; B3s are 
municipalities dominated by small towns, and B4s are municipalities that are predominantly rural. 
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Figure 3: LGES as a percentage of operating revenue 
Source: Authors’ calculations 
 
Figure 4: Total transfer capital funding as a percentage of total capital funding 
 
Source: Authors’ calculations 
What Figures 3 and 4 show is that, given the present configurations, rural municipalities and 
municipalities due for demarcation will never sustain their activities without transfers. Therefore, 
amalgamation will never make them self-reliant because of their limited revenue base and high levels 
of dependency. This implies that the funding model for rural municipalities and those due for 
demarcation should always consist of transfers.  
Own revenue index 
The own revenue index (Figure 5) is used to measure grant dependency of the 52 municipalities to be 
amalgamated. The index is generated from a municipality’s own revenue to total revenues ratio. For 
illustrative purposes, seven examples of municipal clusters for amalgamation are shown in the oval 
shapes in Figure 5. According to the index, own revenue is the main source of income for 35 out of the 
52 municipalities due for amalgamation (i.e. their own revenues are above the South African average). 
Figure 5 shows that most of the municipalities due for amalgamation will always be reliant on transfers. 
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In other words, for many municipalities, a significant degree of dependency will disappear through 
amalgamations, while for some clusters, grant dependency is likely to intensify. This means that 
transfers will continue to be the main funding window for many rural amalgamated municipalities.7  
Figure 5: Own revenue index 
 
Source: Authors’ calculations 
Per capita gross value addition (GVA) index 
This per capita GVA index measures the value of goods and services produced by a municipality over 
a given period. A municipality with a higher per capita GVA value has a potentially larger revenue base 
and greater ability to pay taxes than one with a low GVA value.  
Figure 6: GVA index 
 
Source: Authors’ calculations 
                                                             
7 For example, first oval shows an amalgamation of three municipalities (Camdeboo, Baviaans an Ikwezi), which 
includes a combination of two municipalities (Baviaans and Camdeboo) with a very low revenue base and one 
(Ikwezi) with a good revenue base. Such an amalgamation may not give viable outcome at the end. Thus the ovals 
represent examples of amalgamated municipalities, but for clarity not all amalgamations are shown. 
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All municipalities due for demarcation were compared to the average for all municipalities (Figure 6), 
and oval shapes show some (not all) amalgamation combinations.  It is quite clear that the majority of 
municipalities due for demarcation in 2016 are below the South African GVA average, implying that a 
significant number have a weak potential revenue base. Examples of amalgamations that consist of 
municipalities with GVA per capita indices below average include Camdeboo, Baviaans and Ikwezi; 
Hlabisa and The Big Five False Bay; and Blouberg and Aganang. This suggests that some of the 
proposed amalgamations will not necessarily result in municipalities with a better revenue base. 
Per capita income 
Another well-known indicator of fiscal capacity is per capita income (Tannernwald 1999; 
Bandyopadhyay 2013; Yilmaz et al. 2006). Like per capita GVA, the per capita income measure 
captures the wealth or income potential of a municipality through a community’s ability to meet its 
financial needs. As Figure 7 shows, around 70% of the municipalities to be demarcated in 2016 fall 
below the South African average for per capita income. This is a further indication that, other things 
being held constant, the communities of such municipalities (e.g. the Hlabisa and Big Five False Bay 
amalgamation) would be hard pressed to meet their financial needs. 
Figure 7: Per capita income index 
 
Source: Authors’ calculations 
Employment   
A municipality’s revenue base also depends on the employed population within its jurisdiction. The 
likelihood of a municipality generating a steady stream of revenues is high when a significant proportion 
of its population is employed. Conversely, the tax base is constrained when the unemployment rate is 
high. Figure 8 shows that almost half of the municipalities due for amalgamation in 2016 have below-
average unemployment rates, indicating a weak revenue base. Clusters with above average 
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unemployment rates include Camdeboo, Baviaans and Ikwezi; Inkwanca, Tsolwana and Lukhanji; and 
Ventersdorp and Tlokwe.  
Figure 8: Unemployment index
Source: Authors’ calculations 
Poverty index 
Poverty is another variable that explains a municipality’s fiscal capacity, with high levels of poverty 
implying a weak revenue capacity. Poverty levels for all municipalities due for demarcation were 
compared with the average poverty level for all South African municipalities. Figure 9 indicates that 
over 60% of municipalities fall below the average poverty level. This suggests that for many 
municipalities (e.g. Hlabisa and The Big Five False Bay), the mergers will not improve their poverty 
levels nor their revenue base.  
Figure 9: Poverty index 
 
Source: Authors’ calculations 
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The above analysis suggests that a significant number of municipalities due for amalgamations in 2016 
have weak revenue-raising capacities. This implies that amalgamations will not make many 
municipalities viable or self-sufficient or self-reliant. With weak revenue bases, most of the 
municipalities will continue to depend on transfers. Besides transfers, alternative revenue sources are 
required for such municipalities. The focus should also be on increasing or developing tax bases through 
economic development rather than amalgamating municipalities. 
Viability and demarcation 
Can amalgamations correct for municipal dysfunctionality? 
The functionality of a municipality is a function of many factors, within and outside a municipality’s 
control. The functionality of the municipalities due for amalgamation in 2016 were assessed using four 
factors: (i) institutional management, (ii) financial management, (iii) governance and (iv) service 
delivery. Figure 10 shows that most municipalities (80%) are at risk of being dysfunctional and 6% are 
dysfunctional. Amalgamating municipalities that are at risk of being dysfunctional may actually worsen 
the problem. An interesting result concerns the amalgamation of a functional metro (Mangaung) and a 
dysfunctional rural area (Naledi). While this merger may achieve financial viability/self-reliance, two 
important elements of municipal viability – governance and democracy – may be compromised. With 
the amalgamation, political representation for marginalised communities in Naledi virtually disappear, 
and in many ways rural governance of these communities becomes less functional, as an urban core 
governs and administers rural areas. Although Naledi may not be able to achieve financial viability, it 
could serve a critical constitutional and democratic role. 
Figure 10: Municipal functionality 
 
Source: Authors’ calculations 
Given that many municipalities due for demarcation are not functioning well, the question becomes 
whether demarcation is the appropriate instrument for addressing their challenges and whether 
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functionality can be a criterion for demarcating municipalities. In reality, many factors can cause a 
municipality to be dysfunctional. They include service delivery, institutional management, financial 
management, community satisfaction, and governance or political stability. Furthermore, such factors 
do not have a direct bearing on (or can be influenced by boundary changes). For example, using 
demarcation to correct for financial mismanagement is akin to providing a patient with a wrong pill, 
which may do more harm than good. The primary mandate of the Municipal Demarcation Board (MDB) 
is to demarcate municipal boundaries, delimit wards and carry out municipal capacity assessments, as 
spelt out in the Local Government: Municipal Demarcation Act (No. 27 of 1998). Correcting for 
dysfunctionality in municipalities is clearly not part of the MDB mandate, but that of national and 
provincial governments, which have a range of monitoring, support, regulatory and intervention powers 
at their disposal. As there are no apparent connections between municipal boundaries and municipal 
functionality, elevating the issue of functionality to a demarcation criterion may simply raise 
expectations that will never be fulfilled by demarcation. Furthermore, problems of dysfunctionality are 
often temporary and transient, and cannot be solved by a long-term drastic measure such as demarcation. 
Conclusions and implications 
Government seeks to make rural municipalities self-sufficient and less dependent on transfers. In 2015, 
it proposed using demarcations to achieve financial viability or self-sufficiency, and to improve 
functionality among rural municipalities. However, an analysis of municipalities to be demarcated in 
2016 found that amalgamations will not necessarily result in financially viable municipalities and may 
worsen the situation of some of the demarcated municipalities. The dependency ratio of many 
demarcated rural municipalities is too high to be reversed by amalgamations. Many rural municipalities 
will continue to be transfer dependent, as their revenues bases are fragile and weak. Transfers will 
remain the mainstay of rural local government. The transfer system must also cater for the 
Constitution’s acknowledgement of transfer-dependent municipalities (the Constitution sets no 
financial viability requirement for all municipalities but makes provision for some municipalities to be 
transfer dependent) (Government of South Africa 1996). Some municipalities should exist to serve other 
equally important roles, such as ensuring that communities are politically and democratically 
represented. Amalgamations should carefully be studied, and benefits of amalgamations should be 
based on sound empirical evidence. 
On functionality, the study noted elevating this to a demarcation criterion is problematic as there is no 
direct nor indirect link with municipal boundaries. Municipalities can be dysfunctional for a variety of 
reasons that have no relationship with boundary demarcation. Amalgamations are a long-term measure 
that cannot correct for short-term operational problems associated with municipal dysfunctionality.  
The foregoing analysis has demonstrated that many rural municipalities will continue to be transfer 
dependent. The analysis also suggests that demarcations are a weak instrument for pursuing financial 
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viability of rural municipalities and a wrong one for improving the functionality of municipalities. The 
foregoing analysis lends itself to the following recommendations: 
 Rural municipalities with a low revenue base should be allowed to exist and funded through 
the transfer system and not forced to amalgamate as such municipalities could be serving other 
crucial constitutional imperatives such as democratic representation and community 
participation. For rural municipalities, the funding model should allow for the existence of 
municipalities with a low revenue base rather than forcing amalgamations. This funding model 
should differentiate among rural municipalities, in terms of their revenue base.  
 To achieve financial viability, government should focus on increasing or developing tax bases 
through economic development rather than amalgamating municipalities.  
 Functionality should not be elevated to a demarcation criteria as it has no direct nor indirect 
link with boundary changes. Functionality should be corrected through legislative, policy and 
capacity building measures than through amalgamations. 
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